Rashi on TanakhExodus 22

If while breaking in. If he was actually in the act of breaking in.

There is no liability for his blood. This is not considered murder. It is as if he (the thief) had already been dead. Here the Torah teaches: if someone comes to kill you, kill him first. This [thief] came with the intention of killing you for he knows full well that man cannot control himself while seeing his property being taken from him, and remain silent. Therefore it is with this intention that he came — that if the owner of the property will resist him he will kill him.

If the sun shone on him. This is nothing but an allegory: If the issue is clear to you that his intentions towards you are peaceful — just as this sun represents peace in the world so, too, if it is obvious to you that he has not come with the intention of killing, even should the owner of the property resist, for example: a father who breaks in to steal the property of the son, where it is known that a father has pity for his child and has not come with any intentions of taking a life —

[then] there is liability for his blood. [I.e.,] he is considered alive and it would be murder were the owner of the house to kill him.

He must make full restitution. The thief [shall pay back] the money that he stole, but he is not liable to the death penalty. Onkelos, who translates (אִם זָרְחָה הַשֶׁמֶשׁ עָלָיו): “If witnesses saw him [break in],” chose for himself an alternate explanation: it tells us that if witnesses discovered him before the owner of the house arrived and when the owner of the house comes to attack him they warned him (the owner) not to kill him then he is responsible for his blood — [i.e.] he will be liable [to the death penalty] if he will kill him. For since there are people watching him, then this thief has not come with the intention of taking anyone’s life and will not kill the property owner.

If the stolen article was found in his hand. [Meaning:] in his possession, for he had not slaughtered it nor sold it.

Whether it is an ox or donkey. Any item [that is stolen] is included in the liability to pay twofold restitution, whether it is an animate object or whether it is an inanimate object, for elsewhere it is stated: “for a sheep, a garment, or any lost object, etc. he must pay two-fold to his fellow man.”

He must pay two live animals. He may not pay him with dead ones, but only with live ones or with money that is equivalent to live ones.

כִּי יַבְעֶר, אֶת־בְּעִירֹה, וּבִעֵר . These are terms relating to cattle as in: “We (וּבְעִירֵנוּ) and our cattle.”

כִּי יַבְעֶר . [כִּי יַבְעֶר means:] he leads his cattle into the field or vineyard of his fellow man and causes him damage in one of the two following ways: either by sending in his cattle [to trample on things] or [by allowing them] to feed there. [Accordingly] our Sages explained that וְשִׁלַּח is damage caused by trampling with the foot, whereas וּבִעֵר is damage caused by the “tooth” which eats and consumes.

In another’s field. [בִּשְׁדֵה אַחֵר means:] in another man’s field.

From his prime field he must compensate [the owner]. We evaluate the damage and, if he intends to pay with land as compensation for his damage, he must pay him from the best of his fields; [e.g.] if [the damages] was a sela, then he should give him a sela’s worth from the best of the land that he owns. This verse teaches you that [when land is used as compensation for] damages we evaluate them [to be collected from] the best lands [of the one who caused the damages].

If a fire goes out of control — even by itself.

And [catches on] thorns. קוֹצִים are chardons (thistles) in Old French.

And consumes bound grain. It (the flames) licked the thorns until it reached the bound grain or the standing grain which is still attached to the ground.

Or a field — whereby [the flame] licked up his plowing and he now needs to plow it a second time.

Full restitution must be made by the one who started the fire. Though he lit the fire on his own property and it spread of its own accord by means of thorns which it found he is nevertheless obligated to make restitution for not keeping his burning coal from breaking out and causing damage.

And they are stolen from the house of the [watch]man — according to his own testimony.

If the thief is found he must pay — the thief shall pay two-fold to the owners.

If the thief is not found — then this watchman, who is the owner of the house —

must come — to the judges, so as to adjudicate the case between him (the watchman) and the other (the original owner of the object), and he must swear to him that he did not in any way misappropriate his property.

In every question of dishonesty. Where he is found to have lied under oath — where witnesses testify that he (the watchman) stole it himself and the court finds him guilty [of perjury], based on the testimony of the witnesses, [then —]

He must pay double restitution to his neighbor. The Torah teaches you that if one makes a claim, regarding an object left for safekeeping, saying that it was stolen from him, and then it is discovered that he himself stole it, he must pay double restitution. However, when does this apply? In a case where he swears and afterwards witnesses come [and contradict him] for our Sages expounded [this verse] thus: The owner of the house shall approach the Beis Din this “approaching” refers to taking an oath. You claim that it refers to taking an oath, or perhaps it refers only to presenting the case, and when he presents his case and denies any obligation by claiming it was stolen he is immediately liable to pay twofold once witnesses come [and testify] that it is in his possession? [That this is not the case here is indicated by a גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה:] The term שְׁלִחוּת יָד is stated here and further on the term שְׁלִיחוּת יָד is also used: “An oath to God shall be between them that he did not lay his hand (לֹא שָׁלַח יָדוֹ).” Just as in the latter case it (שְׁלִיחוּת יַד) refers to taking an oath, here, too, it refers to taking an oath.

Of which [a witness] says, “This is it!” According to its plain meaning [it means]: of which a witness says, “this object, about which you swore [that it was stolen]; is [really] in your possession.” Then their dispute shall come before the judges, and they will examine the testimony. If they [turn out to] be honest and they [Beis Din] find the watchman guilty, he must pay twofold. But if the witnesses perjure themselves for they are found to be conspiring witnesses (זוֹמְמִין), they must then pay twofold to the watchman. However, our Sages of blessed memory expounded it [that the watchman claims:] “This is it!” [i.e., “this is what remains of the object, the rest was stolen], which teaches us that we do not obligate him to take an oath unless he made a partial admission by saying: So much and so much I owe you but the rest was stolen from me.”

If a man gives his neighbor a donkey or an ox. The first section deals with a שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם — a watchman who receives no compensation. He is, therefore, not held responsible for theft (i.e., if the item is stolen from him), as is written: “[If a man gives his neighbor...] and they are stolen from the house of the watchman.” “If the thief is not found then the house-owner (the watchman) must come,” to swear. You learn from this that he (the watchman) frees himself [from any responsibility] with this oath. But this section deals with a שׁוֹמֵר שָֹכָר (a watchman compensated for his work), who is not freed from responsibility if [the item to be watched] is stolen, as is written: “But if it was indeed stolen from him he must make restitution.” However, for something over which he has no control, as in a case where it (an animal) died of itself, or was injured, or was forcibly taken by robbers, and there is no one who saw it happen so as to be able to testify about the matter, then —

An oath to Adonoy shall be. He shall swear that it is as he claims and that he did not lay a hand on it to make any personal use of it. For had he laid a hand on it and afterwards an accident happened to it he is liable for those accidents.

The owner must accept it. [I.e., he must accept] the oath.

And he need not make restitution. [I.e., the watchman need not make restitution] to him at all.

If it was torn — by a wild animal.

He must provide witnesses. [I.e.,] he shall bring [two] witnesses that it was torn apart [in a way that was] beyond his control and he will then not be liable to pay restitution.

He need not pay for that which was torn apart. It does not say: טְרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם (he need not pay for [any] one which was torn): but, rather, it says: הַטְּרֵפָה [for this one that was torn). [This indicates that] there is a torn one for which he must pay, and there is a torn one for which he need not pay: For one that was torn apart by a cat, fox, or marten he must pay restitution. Whereas, for one that was torn apart by a wolf, lion, bear, or snake, he need not pay. But who whispered to you to come to these conclusions? Because it is written: “and it dies, or is injured, or is captured.” Just as [the animal’s] dying naturally is something he cannot prevent, so, too, the case of injury and captivity [must be such] that he had no way of preventing it.

If [a man] borrows. [This section] comes to teach you regarding the borrower that he is liable even for accidents.

If the owner is not with him. [Meaning:] if the owner of the ox is not employed by the borrower to do his work.

If the owner is with him. [This teaches that] whether [he is employed] in that work (i.e., the same work as the animal) or whether he [is employed] in other work, as long as he was employed by him at the time he borrowed [the ox], he need not be employed by him at the time of the injury to, or the death [of, the animal].

If it was hired. [I.e.] if the ox was not borrowed but rather hired, then, since it (בָּא בִשְׂכָרוֹ) came for its rental fee into the hands of the lessee, and not through borrowing, and the benefit is not his entirely for it is in return for its rental fee that he uses it, the rule of the borrower does not apply to him — to make him liable even for accidents. The Torah does not make it clear what rule applies to him (the hirer), whether [he is considered] a שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם or a שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר . Therefore the Sages of Yisrael disputed this matter: What manner of restitution does a hirer make? Rabbi Meir said: as a שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם . Rabbi Yehudah said: as a שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר .”

If [a man] seduces. He speaks “to her heart (softly and kindly)” until she consents to him. Onkelos translates it similarly: וַאֲרֵי יְשַׁדֵּל, שִׁדוּל in Aramaic having the same meaning as פִּתּוּי (seducing) in Hebrew.

He must give the dowry. He must set aside a dowry for her as is the law regarding a man and his wife, i.e., he must write a kesubah (marriage contract) and then marry her.

Equal to the dowry usually given to virgins — which is set at fifty silver shekalim in regard to someone who forcibly takes a virgin and lies with her against her will, as it is said: “The man that lay with her must give to the maiden’s father fifty silver shekalim.”

You shall not allow a witch to live. But she must be put to death by the court. [This applies] whether they are male or female but the Torah [uses the feminine] because it speaks of what is usual, for it is women who are most commonly witches.

Whoever lies with an animal must be put to death — by stoning. Both man and woman [who are guilty are stoned], for it is written about them: “Their blood is upon them.”

To a god. [Meaning:] to idols. If it were vocalized לֵאלֹהִים [instead of לָאֱלֹהִים] it would have been necessary to explicitly write: אֲחֵרִים [לֵאלֹהִים] — other [gods]. However, now that it is vocalized לָאֱלֹהִים it is not necessary to define it with the word “other.” For wherever the letters ל' or ב' or ה' are used as a prefix, and are vocalized with a sheva for example: לְמֶלֶךְ (to a king), לְמִדְבָּר (to a desert), לְעִיר (to a city), it is necessary to define which king, which desert, which city. Similarly, (when these letters precede a sheva such as): לִמְלָכִים (for kings), לִרְגָלִים (for holidays) [when the vowel of the prefix is] a chirick, it is necessary to define which ones, for if it (לִמְלָכִים) were not defined it would refer to all kings. Similarly לֵאלֹהִים (to gods) would include all gods even [the One of whom the use of אֱלֹהִים is] holy. But when [one of these letters] is vocalized with a patach as in: לַמֶּלֶךְ (to the king), לַמִּדְבָּר (to the desert) לָעִיר (to the city), then it is known which king is spoken of. So, too, regarding לָעִיר, it is known which city is spoken of. So, too, לָאֱלֹהִים refers to those [gods] that were forbidden to you elsewhere. Similarly: “There is none like You (בָּאֱלֹהִים) amongst the gods,” since בָאֱלֹהִים is not defined [with אֲחֵרִים] it was necessary to vocalize it with a patach.

Must be condemned. [Meaning:] he must be put to death. Why is יָחֳרָם written here? Has not the penalty of death already been stated elsewhere: “You shall take out that man or that woman, etc., [and stone them]”? But [the answer is:] since there it was not made clear what form of worship carries the death penalty, and so that you not think that all forms of [idolatry] worship carry the death penalty, the Torah comes and makes it clear to you here “Whoever slaughters to a god must be condemned [to die], thereby telling you that just as slaughtering is a service that is performed inside [the Mikdosh] when it is done to [the One] in Heaven, so, too, do I include one who burns incense and one who pours libation, which are also services performed inside [the Mikdosh;] and one is liable [for performing] any of these services to idolatry, whether it is the usual way of worshipping it or is not the usual way of worshipping it. But other forms of worship, such as: one who sweeps the floor [before an idol] or one who sprinkles water so as to settle the dust, or one who hugs or kisses [the idol], his penalty is not death, but he transgresses a לַאו — a negative precept.

You must not abuse a stranger. [This refers to] abusive words contralier (to taunt, aggravate) in Old French. as in: “I will feed (אֶת מוֹנַיִךְ) those that abuse you with their own flesh.”

Do not oppress him. [This refers to] robbing him of his money.

For you were strangers. If you abuse him, he, too, is capable of abusing you by saying to you: “You, too, descend from strangers.” With a fault which is your own do not reproach your fellow man. Wherever the term גֵר is used [it denotes] a person who was not born in that country, but came from another land to reside there.

Do not mistreat any widow or orphan. The same applies to any person but the Torah speaks of what is usual, for they are weak and are frequently mistreated.

If you do mistreat him. This is a shortened verse. It threatens but does not make clear his punishment, as in: “Therefore whoever kills Kayin.” [There, too] there is a threat but does not make clear his punishment. Here, too: “If you do mistreat him” conveys a threat, [i.e.] “In the end you will get yours.” Why? “when he cries out to Me, etc.”

Your wives will become widows. From that which is implied by its saying: “and I will kill you,” would I not know myself that “your wives will be widows and your children will be orphans”? But the answer is that this is an additional curse: that the women will be bound as living widows — that there will be no witnesses who can testify to the death of their husbands and they will thus be prohibited from remarrying. And the children will be orphans, [i.e.] the Beis Din will not allow them to take possession of the fathers’ estates, for they do not know whether they died or were taken captive.

When you lend money. Rabbi Yishmael said: Each and every time אִם appears in the Torah [it refers to] something optional except in three instances of which this is one.

My people. [I.e. if you are faced with a choice of lending money to] one of My people or to a gentile, then “one of My people” has priority. [If the choice is between] a poor person and a rich one, then the poor person has priority. [If the choice is between] the poor of your city and the poor of another city, then the poor of your city have priority. And this is the way it is implied [in the text]: “When you lend money, [then,] lend it “to one of My people” and not to the gentile. And to which particular one of My people? “The poor one.” And to which particular poor one? To the one that is “with you.” (An alternate explanation of אֶת עַמִּי: “Do not act disrespectfully towards him when lending him money, for he is one of My people” —

the poor that is with you — [saying, in effect:] “Look at yourself as if you were the poor person.”)

Do not act toward him as a creditor. [I.e.] do not forcibly demand payment from him. If you know that he has no money do not appear towards him as if you have lent him money but, rather, as if you have not lent him, in other words: Do not embarrass him!

Interest. [נֶשֶׁךְ has the meaning of:] “interest” because it is (כִנְשִׁיכַת) like the bite of a snake which bites [inflicting] a small wound in his foot which he does not feel and, suddenly, it burgeons and swells [his entire body] till his head. So it is with interest: He (the borrower) feels nothing and it is not noticeable [at first] until the interest accumulates and causes him a great loss of money.

If you take security. Wherever the term חֲבָלָה appears it does not refer to security [taken] at the time the loan is made but rather the security that is taken from the borrower when the loan comes due and he does not pay. (חָבוֹל תַּחְבֹּל: [The Torah asks] that you repeat taking the security even many times over. God [in effect] says: “How much do you owe Me? and see for yourself that your soul ascends to Me each and every night and gives an accounting of itself and thereby becomes beholden to Me, and yet I return it to you [every morning]. So shall you, too, take the security and return it, take it [again] and return it.)

You must return it till sunset. Return it to him [for] the entire day [so that he may have it] till sunset. And when the sun sets take it again until the morning of the following day. This verse deals with a garment worn by day which he (the borrower) does not need at night.

For this is his covering. This refers to the outer-garment.

His garment. This refers to the shirt [worn on the flesh].

With what shall he lie down? This includes the bed-covering.

Do not curse judges (or God). Here is the prohibition against cursing God as well as the prohibition against cursing judges.

Your fullness. [Meaning:] the obligation that was placed upon you when your grains reach their full ripeness. This refers to בִּכּוּרִים — “the first fruits.”

And your terumah-offering. [וְדִמְעֲךָ refers to] the terumah-offering, but, I do not know why it is called דֶמַע .

You must not delay. [Meaning:] Do not alter their order of separating them [from their fruits], by separating later what should be separated earlier, i.e., he may not [separate] the terumah before [separating] the bikkurim, or the tithe offering before the terumah.

The first-born of your sons, you shall give to Me — by redeeming him for five sela’im from the kohein. But has [the Torah] not given this command elsewhere? But [the reason it is repeated here is] so as to juxtapose it to: “You must do likewise with your oxen,” [thereby teaching that] just as the first-born of man is redeemed after thirty days [from birth], as it is said: “And those that need to be redeemed, you shall redeem from a month old.” So, too, regarding the first-born of the smaller cattle: he (the owner) occupies himself with it for 30 days and, afterwards, gives it to the kohein.

Seven days it shall remain with its mother. This is a warning to the kohein that if he wishes to hurry his sacrifice [of the בְּכוֹר] he may not rush to do so before the eighth day because it is “lacking in time” (i.e., premature).

On the eighth day you must give it to Me. One might think that it is obligatory on that day! [This is not so for] it states here: “the eighth day”, and it states further on: “and from the eighth day onward it shall be accepted.” Just as “the eighth day” mentioned later intends to declare [the animal] fit [for sacrifice] from the eighth day and on, so, too, “the eighth day” mentioned here intends to declare [the animal] fit from the eighth day and on. Hence, this is the intended meaning of it: “And on the eighth day you are permitted to give it to Me” (i.e., to sacrifice it).

You shall be men of holiness to Me. [This is meant as a promise:] “If you will be holy and abstain from the abhorrence of [eating] neveilah and tereifah, then you are (לִי) Mine. But if not, then you are not Mine.

Flesh that was torn off in the field. Actually the same applies within the house, but [the reason “the field” is mentioned is] the Torah speaks of what is common — the place where it is usual for animals to be torn apart [by wild beasts]. Similarly: “For he found her in the field,” Similarly: “One who is unclean as a result of a nocturnal emission,” where the same rule would apply to an emission during the day. The Torah just speaks of what is most common. However, Onkelos translates [וּבָשָׂר בַּשָֹדֶה טְרֵיפָה] as: “Flesh torn from a living animal,” i.e., flesh that was torn off as a result of an attack by a wolf or lion from a permitted beast, or from permitted cattle, while it was alive [“you must not eat”].

Throw it to the dog. [You may sell it] also to a gentile. Or perhaps it refers only to a dog? The Torah therefore says regarding neveilah: “or sell it to a gentile.” [Then we may assume] a fortiori regarding tereifah: that all benefits are permitted [including selling to a gentile]. If so, why does it state: “to the dog”?! To teach you that the dog gets more respect than he. And the verse [also] teaches that God does not withhold the reward that is due to any creature. [And the dog has a reward coming] for its said: “But against any of the B’nei Yisrael no dog wagged its tongue (i.e., barked),” so God said, “Give it its due reward.”