Rashi on TanakhExodus 21

These are the laws. Wherever the word אֵלֶּה (without a vov) is used it disqualifies that which preceded it [But the word] וְאֵלֶּה (with a vov) is a continuation of that which preceded it. [Here too וְאֵלֶּה conveys that] just as the preceding words (the Ten Commandments) were [received] from Sinai these [following laws] also were [received] from Sinai. Then why was the section of judgments placed near the section dealing with the altar? This is to teach you that the chamber of the Sanhedrin should be placed near the Beis Hamikdosh (some mss: the altar).

That you shall set before them. God said to Moshe: “Do not allow it to enter your mind to say, ‘I will teach them the section or the law two or three times until it will become fluent in their mouths exactly as it is taught, but I will not bother myself to make them understand the reasons for each thing and its explanation.’” It therefore states: “that you shall set before them” — like a set table with everything ready to be eaten, for the person.

Before them — and not before the gentiles. And even if you know of a particular law that they render the same as Jewish law, [nevertheless] do not bring the matter to their courts for one who brings law cases of Bnei Yisrael before [the courts of] gentiles profanes the Name of God and esteems the name of the idols bringing [undue] praise to them (other mss: to bring [undue] importance to them) as it is said: “For their rock is not as our Rock that our enemies should be our judges,” [thereby indicating] that when our enemies are our judges, it is testimony to the superiority of their idols.

If you buy a Hebrew slave. [עֶבֶד עִבְרִי here means:] a slave who is a Hebrew. Or perhaps it means the slave of a Hebrew, [i.e.,] a gentile slave bought from a Jew and it is regarding him that it is said: “He shall serve for six years?” [Should you then ask:] how can I explain: “And you shall leave them (the gentile slaves) as an inheritance...?” [I would answer that it refers to a gentile slave] who was bought from the gentiles, but if bought from a Jew he shall go free after six years. Therefore, it states: “If your brother, the Hebrew, is sold to you [he shall serve you six years]” I tell you this (that he serves six years) only in regard to your brother [a Hebrew slave].

If you buy — from the hand of the court that sold him for a theft he committed as it is said: “If he (the thief) has nothing [with which to reimburse his victim], he must be sold for his theft.” Or perhaps it refers to [a slave] who sold himself because of his dire need, but if the court sells him [for theft] he would not go free after six years! [This is wrong] for when the Torah says: “When your brother becomes destitute with you and is then sold to you” — then the selling of oneself out of dire need has already been discussed! Then how do I explain [the verse] כִּי תִקְנֶה [here]? When he is sold through the court!

Free. [לַחָפְשִׁי means:] into freedom.

If he came by himself. [Meaning:] that he was unmarried, as it is translated by Onkelos: אִם בִּלְחוֹדוֹהִי —“if by himself.” The term בְּגַפּוֹ is the same as בִּכְנָפוֹ — “with his skirt,” i.e., he came in as is, alone, wrapped in his garment, in the skirt of his garment.

He shall go out by himself. This teaches that if he was unmarried at first (when he came into servitude), his master may not give him a gentile handmaid [against his will] so as to have slave-children from her.

If he [was] married — to a Jewish woman —

his wife shall go out with him. But who was it that brought her in that [it has to be said that] she goes out? But the Torah teaches that he who acquires a Hebrew slave becomes obligated to support his (the slave’s) wife and children.

If his master should give him a wife. From here [we derive] that his master has the right to give him a gentile handmaid to beget slaves from her. Or perhaps it is only a Jewish wife [that he may give him]. Therefore the Torah says: “The woman and her children belong to her master,” indicating that it refers only to a gentile woman, for a Hebrew handmaid too goes free after six years and even earlier than six years, if she shows signs of puberty, she goes free, as it is said: “[If] your Hebrew brother or sister [be sold to you they shall serve you for six years]” which teaches that also a Hebrew handmaid goes free after six [years].

My wife. The handmaid.

To the judges. אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים means — “to court.” He (the slave) should consult with those who sold him, for it was they who sold him to him (the master).

To the door or to the doorpost. This might lead you to think that the doorpost is a proper place upon which to pierce. The Torah therefore says: “You shall put the awl in his ear and in the door” — in the door but not in the doorpost. Then why does the Torah say: “or to the doorpost?” This is to compare the door with the doorpost: just as the doorpost is upright, so too must the door be upright.

And his master shall pierce his ear with an awl. The right [ear]. Or perhaps it refers to the left one? Therefore the Torah says: “אֹזֶן” [here and] אֹזֶן [elsewhere] so as to make an analogy [called a גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה]: here it states: “And his master shall pierce אָזְנוֹ (his ear),” and regarding a metsorah it states: “The right ear lobe of the one to be purified.” Just as in the latter verse it refers to the right one, here, too, it refers to the right one. Why was the ear chosen to be pierced rather than all the other limbs of the body? Said Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai: The ear, which heard upon Mount Sinai, “You shall not steal!” and, he nevertheless, went ahead and stole, should [have his ear] pierced! And in the case where he sold himself: The ear that heard on Mount Sinai: “For to Me are the B’nei Yisrael servants” and he, nevertheless, went ahead and acquired a master for himself, should [have his ear] pierced! Rabbi Shimon expounded this verse in a beautiful manner: Why are the door and the doorpost different from other objects of the house? God, in effect, said: “The door and doorpost were witnesses in Egypt when I passed over the lintel and the two doorposts, and I said: ‘For to me are the B’nei Yisrael servants’” — they are My servants, not servants of servants, and this person went ahead and acquired a master for himself, he shall [have his ear] pierced in their presence.

He then serves his master forever. [This means] until yovel (the Jubilee year). Or perhaps it means forever as is its literal meaning? The Torah therefore says: “And each man will return to his family.” This teaches that fifty years are referred to as forever. This does not mean that he serves him for the entire fifty years, but rather he serves him till the Jubilee, whether it is near at hand, whether it is far off.

If a man sell his daughter to be a maidservant. This verse speaks of a minor [daughter]. One might think [that the verse applies] even if she shows signs [of puberty]. You must say [that this is not so] a fortiori: Just as one who is sold beforehand (as a minor) goes free upon showing signs [of puberty], as is written: “She goes out free, with no repayment of money,” which we expound as referring to one who shows signs of adolescence, then one who has not yet been been sold [at this age] does logic not dictate that she not be sold at all?

She shall not go out [free] in the manner of male slaves. [I.e.,] in the manner that gentile slaves go free, for they go free [for the loss] of a “tooth and an eye.” But this woman does not go free for the loss of “tooth and eye” but rather she serves for six years or until the Jubilee, or until she shows signs of puberty. Whichever [of these] comes first brings her freedom first. However, he (the master) must reimburse her for the value of her eye or the value of her tooth. Or perhaps this is not so, but rather “she shall not go free in the manner of the slaves” [means in the manner of Hebrew slaves who go free] after six years or the Jubilee year? The Torah therefore says: “If there should be sold to you your Hebrew brother or your Hebrew sister,” thereby comparing the Hebrew woman to the Hebrew man in regard to all manners of their attaining their freedom: Just as the Hebrew man goes free after six years and the Jubilee year so too the Hebrew woman goes free after six years and the Jubilee year. Then what is the meaning of לֹא תֵצֵא כְצֵאת הָעֲבָדִים? [It means:] she shall not go free [for the loss] of the ends of the limbs as do the gentile slaves. One might think that the Hebrew slave does go free for the loss of the ends of the limbs, Therefore the Torah says: “The Hebrew slave or the Hebrew maidservant,” thereby comparing the Hebrew man to the Hebrew woman: just as the Hebrew woman does not go out free for the loss of the ends of the limbs so too does he (the Hebrew man) not go free for the loss of the ends of the limbs.

If she is displeasing to her master. [Meaning:] she has not found favor in his eyes so that he might marry her.

Who had not designated her as his wife. [Meaning:] that he should have designated her and should have married her. The money used for her purchase serves as the “money” for executing the marriage. Here the Torah implies that it is a mitzvah for him to marry her. It [also] indicates to you that she requires no other marriage ritual.

He must allow her to be redeemed. [וְהֶפְדָּהּ means:] he must give her the opportunity to be redeemed and to go free, for he, too, must aid in her redemption. And what is this opportunity that he gives to her? He deducts from her redemption price according to the number of years that she has served him, as if she had been hired by him. How is this [calculated]? If [for example] he bought her for a maneh and she has worked for him for two years, they say to him: “You were aware that she was destined to go free at the end of six years. Consequently you have bought each year’s work for one-sixth of a maneh. Now she has served you for two years. Thereby [giving you] one-third of a maneh’s [worth of service]. Take therefore two-thirds of a maneh and let her go free from your possession.”

He has no power to sell her to an alien people. [Meaning:] that he may not sell her to another man — neither the master nor the father [may do so].

For he has dealt deceitfully with her. [Meaning:] if he (the master) intends to deal deceitfully with her by not fulfilling with her the mitzvah of designating her as his wife. So too the father [may not sell her again], since he has dealt deceitfully with her by selling her to this one.

If he has designated her as a wife for his son. [“He” refers to] the master. This teaches that the son, too, may stand in his (the master’s) place for the purpose of designating her as his wife, if his father consents, and he will not require another marriage ritual, but rather just says to her: “You are hereby designated to me as a wife for the money that your father accepted as your price.”

The same rights as daughters. [The rights to] food, clothing, and marital relations.

If he takes himself another [wife] — besides her.

Her sustenance, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he must not diminish — from the maidservant whom he had already designated as his wife.

Her sustenance. [שְׁאֵרָהּ means:] food.

Her clothing. [כְּסוּתָהּ is translated in] its literal sense.

Her conjugal rights. [עֹנָתָהּ refers to] marital relations.

If he does not do these three things to her If he does none of these three things to her — what are the three things [referred to here]? [they are:] 1. He should designate her as his wife, or, 2. [as the wife] of his son or, 3. he shall deduct from her redemption price and she would go out free. But this man has not designated her as a wife, neither for himself, nor for his son nor did she have the means to redeem herself, [then —]

she goes out free. The Torah adds a way of going free for this woman in addition to the ways provided for male slaves. And what is this [additional] way of going free? [The verse intends] to teach you that she gains her freedom by showing signs [of puberty] but she must stay with him until she demonstrates signs [of puberty]. Should the six years [of her service] arrive before her signs [of puberty] then we have already learned the she goes free, as it is said: “[If a] Hebrew man or woman [be sold to you] they shall serve you for six years, [and in the seventh year you shall set him free].” Then what is meant by what is said here: “She goes out for nothing?” That if her signs [of puberty] appear before [she completes] the six years [of service], she goes free as a result of them. Or perhaps the Torah means to say [here] that she goes free only upon reaching adulthood? The Torah therefore states: “With no repayment of money” — to add her being freed as a result of reaching adulthood. But if they were not both said I would have assumed that וְיָצְאָה חִנָּם refers to the reaching of adulthood. Therefore they are both said so as not to give an opening to one who may want to oppose [the said conclusion] to dispute it.

If one strikes a man and he [the victim] dies. Many verses were written in the sections concerning murderers and whatever is in my ability to explain as to why they were stated, I shall explain.

If one strikes a man and he dies. Why was said? Since it is said: “If a man should strike any human being he shall be put to death,” I might conclude [from this:] [even if it is] a blow which does not cause death. Therefore the Torah says [here]: “If one strikes a man and he dies” [thereby clarifying that] he is not liable unless he struck a blow which caused death. If [only] מַכֵּה אִיש — “If one strikes a man” was said, and וְאִישׁ כִּי יַכֶּה — “If a man should strike” was not said, I would have concluded that he is not liable unless he strikes an adult man; but were he to strike a woman or a minor how would we know [that he is liable]? Therefore the Torah says: “If he should strike any human being” — even a minor, even a woman. Furthermore, had it said [only] מַכֵּה אִישׁ I would have concluded that even were a minor to strike a blow and kill he would be liable. Therefore the Torah says: “If a man should strike a blow,” but not a minor who struck a blow. Furthermore, [had it said only:] “If he should strike any human being” even a baby that cannot live would be included. The Torah therefore says: “If one strikes a man.” indicating that he is not liable unless he kills a viable person who is fit to be “a man.”

But if he did not lie in wait. [I.e.,] he did not wait for him in ambush and he had no intent [to kill him]. Lie in wait (צָדָה) “means to lie in ambush.” Similarly it states: “You (צֹדֶה) lie in ambush for my soul, to take it.” It is impossible to say that צָדָה is derived from הַצָּד צַיִד — [“the one that has hunted game”], for the [verb for] “hunting” of animals does not take the letter hey in its verb, and the noun [for hunting] is צַיִד whereas the other one’s noun is צְדִיָּה (lying in wait ) and its verb is צוֹדֶה (to lie in wait) whereas this one’s verb (to hunt) is צָד . [Therefore] I say that its meaning is as Onkelos translates it: “and if he did not lie in ambush for him.” However, Menachem [Ibn Saruk] lists it in his Machberes under the section of צָד צַיִד (hunting) but I do not agree with him. If it is to be listed in one of the צָד sections we should preferably list it in the section: “you will be carried on (צַד) her side” [or:] “I will shoot arrows (צִדָּה) on that side” [or:] “And he shall speak (לְצַד) towards the One Above.” Here, too, אֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה [would mean]: he has not taken any side (i.e., opportunity) to find any side (i.e., occasion) for killing. This explanation, too, is questionable yet [this latter explanation is preferable to Menachem’s for] it has the connotation of “ambush.”

But God brought it to his hand. [אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ means:] prepared it for his hand, from the same derivation as: “No evil shall (תְאֻנֶּה) befall you,” [or:] “No iniquity (יְאֻנֶּה) shall befall a tzaddik, ” [or:] “(מִתְאַנֶּה) He makes himself ready for me.” I.e., he prepares to find some opportunity against me.

But God brought it to his hand. Why would such a thing result from Him? This is what David meant when he said: “As the proverb of the Ancient One says: ‘Wickedness emanates from the wicked.’” The “proverb of the Ancient One” refers to the Torah, which is the “proverb” of God, Who is the “Ancient One” (i.e., precedes) of the universe. And where is it that the Torah said that wickedness emanates from the wicked? [Here where] “God brought it to his hand”; for what is the case that this verse discusses? [It concerns] two people — one killed accidentally and the other killed with premeditation but there were no witnesses who could testify [against them]. [Hence] the latter one was not executed and the former was not sent into exile. God then causes them to meet at the same inn. The one who killed with premeditation is sitting under a ladder and the one who killed accidentally goes up the ladder and falls upon the one who killed with premeditation, and kills him, and witnesses testify against him making him liable to be exiled. The result is that the one who killed accidentally is exiled and the one who killed with premeditation is killed.

Then I will designate for you a place. even [for now] in the desert so that [the murderer] can flee there. Which was the place that gave him refuge? It was the camp of the Levites.

If a man plots. Why is this [verse] said? Because [from that which] it states: “If one strikes a man, etc.” I might conclude [that all the following are liable to death:] a doctor who killed [in the course of treatment], and a court-officer who killed [inadvertently, while adminstering] forty lashes, and a father who strikes his son [inadvertently killing him.] and a teacher who disciplines his student [thereby killing him] and who [attempting to kill an animal] kills a man. The Torah therefore says: “If he plots,” but not inadvertently; “to kill him intentionally,” but not a court officer, or a doctor or one who disciplines his son or student, for, though they [struck their blows] intentionally, they did not plan [to kill].

From My altar. Even if he is a kohein and wishes to perform the service you must take him to be executed.

Whoever strikes his father or his mother. Since we have learned that one who wounds his fellow man is liable to pay for damages but he is not to be put to death, it was necessary to state that one who wounds his father is to be put to death. But he is liable only with a blow which causes a wound.

His father or his mother. [Meaning:] either one or the other.

He shall be put to death — by strangulation.

Whoever steals a man and sells him. Why is this said? Since it is said: “If a man be found to have stolen a person from among his fellow — men [he shall die]” I would know only [that this applies to] a man who stole another person. But a woman, or one whose gender is indistinguishable, or a hermaphrodite [who stole], how would we know [that this law applies]? Therefore the Torah says: “Whoever steals a person and sells him.” And since it is stated here: “Whoever steals a man,” I might think that [this applies] only if he steals a man. How would I know if he steals a woman? Therefore the Torah says: “If he steals a person.” It is for this reason that both [verses] are necessary, what one omits the other reveals.

If he is found in his hand. [Meaning:] that witnesses saw him stealing him and selling him and he was already in his (the thief’s) possession before he sold him.

He shall be put to death — by strangulation. Wherever the Torah mentions an unspecified death it refers to strangulation. (It [the Torah] interrupted the context and wrote: “Whoever steals a man” between “Whoever strikes his father or mother” and “Whoever curses his father or mother.” It seems to me that this is the basis for the dispute [between the Sages], where one maintains that we compare striking to cursing and the other holds that we do not compare them)

Whoever curses his father or his mother. Why is this said? Since it states: “If a man curses his father” I might think that only a man who cursed his father [is liable]. But if a woman cursed her father, how would we know [that she is liable]? The Torah therefore says: “Whoever curses his father or mother,” generalizing so as to include both man and woman. If so then why is it necessary to state: “If a man curses?” It is to exclude a minor [from liability].

He shall be put to death — by stoning. Wherever it is said: “His blood is upon him” [then the death penalty] is stoning. The original verse [from which we know this to be] in all cases [is:] “They shall be stoned with rocks, their blood is upon them,” and regarding one who curses his father or mother it states: “His blood is upon him”

When men quarrel. Why is this said? From that which is said: “An eye for an eye” we would learn only [the requirement to compensate] the value of his (the injured person’s) limbs but [the requirement to compensate for] the loss of work and medical costs we would not have learned. Therefore this section needed to be said.

But becomes bed ridden. As Onkelos translates it: “And he will fall into idleness,” [i.e.,] to illness that will keep him from his work.

On his own power. [Meaning:] on his health and his strength.

The one who struck him shall be acquitted. Would it enter your mind that this person, who has not killed would be killed?! But here you are taught [by וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה] that he is imprisoned until it becomes clear whether the other one (the victim) will recover. And this is the meaning [of this verse]: When the other (the victim) rises and walks “with his cane” (i.e., his health returns) then the one who struck the blow is acquitted but as long as the other has not risen, then the one who struck the blow is not acquitted.

Still he must pay for his loss of work. His loss of work due to the illness. [E.g.,] if he cut off the other’s hand or foot, we calculate his loss of work due to the illness [caused by his injury] as if he wore a watchman over gourds for even after his illness is over he will not be fit for work that requires hands or feet and he has already compensated him, as a result of [his paying him] his damages, the value of his hand or foot, as it is said: “A hand for a hand, a foot for a foot.”

And must pay for his complete cure. As Onkelos translates it: [וַאֲגַר אָסְיָא יְשַׁלֵּם] — he must pay the doctor’s fee.

If a man strikes his male or female slave. This verse speaks of a gentile slave. Or perhaps it speaks of a Hebrew [slave]? Therefore the Torah states: “For he is his master’s property.” Just as his property is his forever so too the slave [discussed here] is the one that is his forever. But he was included in [the general rules]: “Whoever strikes a man who dies [shall be put to death]!” But [the answer is:] that this verse comes and singles him out of the general rule, to indicate that he (the struck slave) is to be judged by the rule of “a day or two,” that if he did not die beneath his hand but lingered for a period of twenty-four hours, [then the master is] free [from the death penalty].

With a rod. When it (the rod) is capable of causing death — the Torah is speaking. Or perhaps it refers even to [a rod] which is incapable of causing death? Therefore the Torah says concerning a Yisraelite [victim]: “And if with a stone in his hand, whereby he would die, did he strike him.” Now in this matter does it not follow a fortiori. Just as [when the victim is] a Yisraelite [whose murder is] more stringent, and he (the murderer) is not liable [to be put to death] unless he struck him with something that is capable of causing death, and upon a limb which is capable of causing death with this sort of a blow, then regarding [a victim who is] a slave, whose killing is more lenient, it follows even more so.

[The death] must be avenged. Through death by the sword, for the Torah similarly states: “a sword that avenges the vengeance of the covenant.”

However, if he survives for a day or two his death is not avenged. If one day[’s survival] frees [the master from the death penalty,] then is not two days’ survival even more self-evident? But [the answer is that יוֹמַיִם is said to teach that] “one day” should be as two days. And how is this? A full day of twenty-four hours.

[The death] is not avenged for he is his property. But if another person would strike him, then even were he to linger for 24 hours before dying, he (the one who struck the slave) would be liable.

If men will fight — with one another, and one intended to strike the other and [inadvertently] struck the woman.

And they strike. נְגִיפָה always has the meaning of “shoving” and “striking,” as in: “Lest you strike your foot against a rock,” [or:] “before your feet are struck,” [or:] “For a stone for striking.”

but there is no fatal injury — to the woman.

He is to be punished — by paying for the value of the offspring to the husband. [How is their value determined?] we evaluate what her price would be if she were sold in the market place [as a slave], increasing her value due to her pregnancy.

He is to be punished. They shall impose monetary compensation on him as in: “(וְעָנְשׁוּ) they shall impose upon him a payment of one hundred silver [shekels].”

When the husband demands etc. [I.e.,] when the husband summons him to the court [asking the court] to place a penalty on him for this.

He shall pay. I.e., the one who struck [the one woman] [shall pay] the value of the offspring.

As determined by the judges. [בִפְּלִלִים means:] as determined by the judges.

However if there is a fatal injury — to the woman.

You shall give [up] a life for a life. Our Sages have differing opinions regarding this matter. Some say [that it means] literally, a life. Others, however, say [that it means] monetary compensation but not, literally, a life, for one who intends to kill one person and killed another, is exempt from the death penalty. He must compensate the heirs with his (the victim’s) worth as if he were someone sold in the marketplace.

An eye for an eye. If he blinded the eye of another person he must compensate him for the worth of his eye, [i.e.,] the amount his worth decreased were he to be sold [as a slave] in the marketplace. all the other cases are similar to this and they do not refer to the actual removal of a limb, as our Sages expounded in Chapter Hachovel.

A burn for a burn. [כְּוִיָּה means:] burn caused by fire. Up to this point (i.e., the previous verse) the Torah has spoken of a wound whereby [the victim suffers] a lessening of worth But now [it speaks of one] whereby [the victim does not suffer] a lessening of worth, but only pain, for example, where one burnt another on his nails with a hot spit, we would estimate how much [money] such a person would be willing to accept to undergo such pain.

A wound. [פֶּצַע] is a wound that draws blood whereby his (the victim’s) flesh was lacerated, navrdure in Old French — “a wound.” [The liability of the one inflicting the wound] all depends on what occurred: If [the blow] causes a diminishing of [the victim’s] worth he must pay damages. If [the victim] is confined to bed, he must pay for loss of work, and medical costs, and the shame the victim suffers and the pain the victim suffers. Actually this verse is superfluous. In the Chapter Hachovel our Sages expound it to make him liable for inflicting pain even where damages [have been paid], i.e., although he has compensated him for the value of his hand, we do not absolve him from [paying for] the pain, by suggesting that since he (the damager) has, in effect, bought his (the victim’s) hand he therefore should have the right to sever it in whatever manner he wishes, But rather we say: he should have severed it with an anesthetic, whereby the victim would not endure so much pain. But he, however, severed it with metal and inflicted pain [and he must therefore pay for that pain].

A bruise. חַבּוּרָה is a wound where the blood collects but does not break through [the skin] only that the flesh of that area becomes red. The term חַבּוּרָה is taje in Old French as in: “or the leopard (חֲבַרְבְּרֹתָיו) his spots. ” Onkelos, however, translates it (חַבּוּרָה) “מַשְׁקוֹפֵי,” meaning “a blow.” Batdure in Old French — “a blow, a beating.” Similarly “שְׁדוּפוֹת קָדִים” — “beaten by the east-wind” is translated by Onkelos: “שְׁקִיפָן קִּדּוּם” [which means:] “beaten by the wind.” Similarly עַל הַמַּשְׁקוֹף — “on the lintel,” so-called because the door beats against it.

The eye of his slave — who is gentile. But a Hebrew [slave] does not go out free due to the loss of a tooth or an eye as we have already said regarding [the verse] “She shall not go free as do the [gentile] male-slaves.”

As compensation for the eye. The same [applies to the loss of] 24 tips of limbs: the fingers of the hands and feet, the two ears, the nose and the רֹאֹש הַגְּוִיָּה which is the membrum. Then why are the tooth and eye both mentioned? Because if “the eye” was mentioned and “the tooth” would not be mentioned I would have said [that “the tooth” is excluded]: Just as the eye was created together with him so, too, any [limb] that was created together with him, whereas “the tooth” was not created together with him. Had “the tooth” been mentioned and “the eye” not been mentioned, I would have said [that this law also includes] even a “baby-tooth,” though it replaces itself. Therefore “the eye” is mentioned.

If an ox gores. Whether it be an ox or any animal, beast or bird. But the Torah speaks of what is common.

And its flesh may not be eaten. From that which is implied by what is said: “The ox shall be stoned” would I not myself know that it is neveilah and the eating of neveilah is prohibited? But then why does the Torah state [here] “and its flesh may not be eaten?” [To teach] that even were he to ritually slaughter it after the sentence has been set by the court, nevertheless, its eating is prohibited. From where do we derive that all benefit [is prohibited as well]? The Torah states: “The owner of the ox shall be נָקִי (lit. clean),” which is to be understood as when a man says to another: “So and so has (יָצָא נָקִי) been cleaned out of his properties and has no benefit from them whatever.” That is its midrashic explanation (i.e., of וּבַעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי). But its plain meaning is as it implies: Since regarding a מוּעָד it is stated: “and the owner shall also die,” it was necessary to state, regarding a תַּם, “And the owner of the ox shall go unpunished.”

Yesterday and the day before — making it a total of three gorings.

And a warning was given to its owner. [וְהוּעַד is] a term denoting a warning given before witnesses as in: “The man has (הָעֵד הֵעִד) warned us.”

And it kills a man, etc. Since it has been stated [in the previous verse]: “If [an ox] will gore” I could only know [that this law applies] when it killed him through goring. Were it to kill him with biting, shoving, and kicking, how would I then know it? Therefore the Torah states: [the extra] וְהֵמִית .

And the owner also shall die — by Divine decree. One might think that [he dies] at the hand of man. The Torah therefore states: “The one who struck the blow shall be put to death, he is a murderer.” For a murder committed by himself you must put him to death, but you do not put him to death for the killing committed by his ox.

When an atonement — fine shall be imposed on him. The word אִם here is not conditional but, rather, is the same as in “(אִם) when you shall lend money,” [where the word אִם] has the meaning “when.” Thus this is the law [regarding the owner who is liable to death by Divine decree]: that the court impose indemmity on him.

And he must give for the redemption of his soul. [This refers to] the worth of the injured party. This is Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion. But Rabbi Akiva says: the worth of the one whose ox did the damage.

Whether it is a son that is gored. [This refers to] a son who is a minor

Or a daughter — who is a minor. Since it states: “If it kills a man or a woman,” I might have thought that he is liable only for [the deaths of] adults. Therefore the Torah states: “Whether it is a son that is gored, etc. to indicate that he is liable for [the deaths of] minor just as [he is liable for the deaths of] adults.

If a male or female slave — gentile [slaves].

[Its owner] must give thirty silver shekalim. This is a decree of the Torah, whether he is worth one thousand zuz or if he is worth but a dinar. A shekel has the weight of four gold coins which total half an ounce according to the correct weight of [the province of] Cologne.

If a man uncovers a pit — which was covered and he uncovered it.

Or if [a man] digs. Why need this be said? If he is liable for uncovering it, then he certainly [is liable] for digging it. But the answer is: [the intent here is] to include one who digs a pit [to completion] after another has dug: he (the one who completed the pit) is liable.

And does not cover it. But if he covers it, he is not liable. The Torah speaks of digging in the public domain.

An ox or a donkey. The same law applies to any animal or beast, because wherever it says שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר we derive it [from a גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה] that “שׁוֹר” [is the same as] “שׁוֹר” regarding Shabbos, where it is said: “So that your ox and donkey may rest.” And just as in the latter case all animals and beasts are [to be treated the same] as the ox, for it says elsewhere: “And all your animals;” here, too, all animals and beasts [have the same rules] as the ox. The only reason it does state שׁוֹר וַחֲמוֹר is [so that you may infer]: “an ox,” but not a man a “donkey,” but not vessels.

The owner of the pit. [This means:] the one who instigated the damage. Even though the pit does not belong to him, i.e., where he made it in the public domain, [nevertheless] the Torah considers him the owner for the purpose of making him liable for damages.

He must compensate its owner with money. The word יָשִׁיב comes to include [that he may pay with] anything that is worth money even “bran” (i.e., a low-quality commodity).

And the dead [animal] remains his. I.e., the injured party’s. We evaluate the carcass and he (the injured party) takes it as [partial] payment. Then the one who caused the damage pays him the remainder, so as to make up for his loss.

If it injures. [יִגּוֹף means:] it will shove, whether with its horns, or with its body, or its legs, or whether it bit [the other ox]. These are all included in the term: נְגִיפָה, for נְגִיפָה means nothing but “striking a blow.”

A man’s ox. [שוֹר אִישׁ here means:] the ox of a man.

They shall sell the ox, etc. (Where both oxen are) of equal value is (the case of which) the Torah is speaking. For example: An ox worth 200 zuz killed an ox also worth 200 zuz, regardless whether the carcass is worth a lot or it is worth a little: when this one (the מַזִּיק) takes half the live animal and half the dead one and the other (the נִיזָּק) [takes] half the live one and half the dead one, it follows that each one of them suffers half the loss that was caused by the killing [of the animal]. [Consequently] we learn from this that a תַּם (the damaging animal in this case) [always] pays [only] half the damages. For from [the case where both animals] are equal in value you may infer [a case] where they are of unequal value that the law of the תַּם is to pay half the damages, not more and not less. Or perhaps I might think otherwise: that even if they (the oxen) were not of equal value when they were both alive the Torah states: they divide them both. [This cannot be so for] if you would say this then there would be times when the one causing the damage may profit a great deal — in a case where the carcass is worth much more, when sold to gentiles, than the worth of the damaging ox. And it is inconceivable that the Torah should state that the one causing the damage should profit. Or sometimes [it will result] in the damaged party getting much more than the worth of full damages — where the half the value of the goring ox is worth more than the full value of the damaged ox. If you would accept this, then a תַּם would be more stringent than a מוּעָד (an ox who had already gored three times). Hence you are forced to admit that the Torah here speaks only in a case where [both animals] are of equal value, and it teaches you that a תַּם pays half the damages. And from [the case] where they are of equal value you derive [the law] to where they are of unequal value, that the one who collects for half damages we evaluate the carcass for him and whatever loss he incurred due to the death [of the animal] he takes half the value of his loss and goes on his way. Why is it that the Torah puts it in these terms and does not simply say: “He shall pay half?” To teach that a תַּם pays only to the extent of its own worth. And if it (the תַּם) gored and died afterwards, the damaged party gets only the carcass and if [the carcass] does not amount to half his damages, he suffers the loss. Or, if an ox worth 100 gored an ox worth 500 zuz, he (the injured party) gets no more than the ox, for the owner of a תַּם is not responsible to pay from his other properties.

If it was known. [Meaning:] or it was not a תַּם but rather it was known that it is a goring ox, [having gored] today, yesterday, and the day before, thereby establishing three gorings.

Then he must pay an ox. [Meaning:] full compensation.

The dead animal shall be his. [I.e., shall belong] to the damaged party, and the one causing the damage shall add to it until the damaged party will have been compensated for his full damages.

Five oxen, etc. Said Rabbon Yochanan ben Zakkai: God respects the honor of his creatures: An ox, which walks on its own legs, [when it is stolen] and the thief was not demeaned by having to carry it on his shoulders, he must pay back fivefold. [Whereas, if he steals] a sheep, which he has to carry on his shoulders, he must pay [only] fourfold, since he was demeaned in the process. Said Rabbi Meir: Come and see how great is the power of work: [The thief, who by stealing] an ox, kept it from its work, must pay five fold. [whereas, if he steals] a sheep, whereby he did not keep it from its work, [he pays only] fourfold.

For each ox ... for each sheep. The Torah repeats them, (i.e., שׁוֹר and שֶׂה) to indicate that the payments of four or five fold apply only to an ox or a sheep.